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Laws of Nature, Natural Properties, and the
Robustly Best System
Michela Massimi*
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a famous objection against David Lewis’s Best System Analysis
(BSA) of laws of nature. The objection—anticipated and discussed by Lewis (1994)—
focuses on the standards of simplicity and strength being (in part) a matter of psychol-
ogy. Lewis’s answer to the objection relies on his metaphysics of natural properties and
its ability to single out the robustly best system, a system that is expected to come out
far ahead of its rivals under any standard of simplicity and strength. The main task of
this paper is to argue that Lewis’s reply to the objection in terms of nature being kind
to us does not succeed, if nature’s kindness is understood in terms of the naturalness of
the properties composing the Humean mosaic. For epistemic access to natural proper-
ties is downstream to any previous identiﬁcation of the best system. A possible
Lewisian rejoinder in terms of a cross-world Humean mosaic of natural properties is
considered and rebutted. The paper concludes by suggesting that Lewis could instead
avail himself of a better answer to the objection, if the standards of simplicity and
strength were reinterpreted along perspectivalist lines.
1. INTRODUCTION
What is a law of nature? David Lewis’s (1973) influential answer to this question
builds upon earlier remarks by J.S. Mill and F. Ramsey: laws are axioms or theorems
in the best deductive system. The best system is the system that achieves the best
balance (let us call it B) between the standard of simplicity (S) and strength (I, un-
derstood as the information content of the system).1 Lewis’s Best System Analysis
(BSA) of lawhood is metaphysically modest and Humean in flavour. Laws do not
govern nature because they ultimately supervene on non-nomic facts about natural
properties in a hypothetical Humean mosaic. If we were omniscient enough to know
the full Humean mosaic of non-nomic facts, we would be able to order and systema-
tize the related store of nomic facts (supervenient on them) into a best system (i.e.,
the one that would deliver laws of nature qua axioms or theorems). Lewis’s BSA tac-
itly assumes some kind of God’s-eye access to the Humean mosaic (what Ned Hall
has aptly called LOPP, or the Limited Oracular Perfect Physicist [Hall 2015, 15]) to
judge how nonmodal facts about the distribution of natural properties map onto
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fundamental laws of nature. On Lewis’s account, it is ultimately the job of physics to
identify the perfectly natural properties composing the Humean mosaic. The distinction
between natural and unnatural properties is taken as primitive.2 The co-occurrence of
specific pairs of natural properties is taken to underpin lawful, regular patterns in nature
(for example, the natural property of having half-integral spin co-occurs with the prop-
erty of being in an antisymmetric state; and their co-occurrence underpins Pauli’s exclu-
sion principle).
My main task in this essay is to query the interplay between the Lewisian stan-
dards for the Best System and the appeal to sparse natural properties in identifying
what Lewis called the robustly Best System. My final goal is to argue for the need to
supplement Lewis’s account of the robustly Best System, over and above his appeal
to sparse natural properties. Section 2 lays out Lewis’s considered answer to what he
regarded as the menace of the so-called ‘ratbag idealist’ to his Best System account of
lawhood. Section 3 argues that Lewis’s answer in terms of nature being kind to us,
and hence ultimately in terms of natural properties, in and of itself does not succeed.
Section 4 considers and rebuts a possible Lewisian rejoinder in terms of a cross-
world Humean mosaic to define natural properties. Section 4 concludes the paper by
proposing a friendly amendment to the Lewisian BSA along perspectivalist lines
(building on Massimi [forthcoming]).
2. WHAT MAKES A SYSTEM ROBUSTLY THE BEST? NATURAL
PROPERTIES AND THE LUNACY OF THE RATBAG IDEALIST
Building on Ramsey’s remarks on lawhood, Lewis famously puts forward an account
of lawhood which takes contingent generalisations as laws of nature if and only if
they feature as theorems or axioms in each of the true deductive systems that
achieves the best combination of simplicity and strength (Lewis 1973, 73). The foot-
note accompanying the relevant passage adds, “I doubt that our standards of simplic-
ity would permit an infinite ascent to better and better systems; but if they do, we
should say that a law must appear as a theorem in all sufficiently good true systems”
(ibid.). Lewis regards true deductive systems as balancing the standards of simplicity
and strength, which from the outset Lewis is willing to concede as our own standards
(not God’s ones; although God has “His standard of truthfulness,” which He might
bestow upon humankind in the form of a “Concise Encyclopaedia of Unified Science”).
Thus, lawhood—on Lewis’s account—is a contingent property of our best system.
Yet lawhood (Lewis warns) is not lawlikeness plus truth: a true universal generaliza-
tion that is regarded as lawlike would not qualify as a law, unless it featured as either
an axiom or a theorem in the best deductive system.
Over the years, Lewis’s account has invited reactions to the effect that the chosen
standards for the best system (simplicity and strength) are too vague to bear the epi-
stemic weight Lewis placed on them. Moreover, Lewis’s claim that his account ex-
plains why we have reasons for taking the theorems of our well-established scientific
theories “provisionally as laws” seems to buy into what Bas van Fraassen has called
Lewis’s “eschatology of science” (van Fraassen 1989, 59). The claim that “our scien-
tific theorizing is an attempt to approximate, as best as we can, the true deductive
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system with the best combination of simplicity and strength” (Lewis 1973, 74) might
well belong to an irenic image of how science progresses and unfolds. But it finds no
counterpart in the much more mundane details of how—as a matter of daily prac-
tice—scientists go about finding laws of nature, or how scientific theories come and
go across historical periods.
Aware of the objections, over the years Lewis refined the view to tackle what he
deemed the worst lunacy his account could (mistakenly) be held responsible for, the
lunacy of the ratbag idealist:
The worst problem about the best-system analysis is that when we ask where
the standards of simplicity and strength and balance come from, the answer
may seem to be that they come from us. Now, some ratbag idealist might say
that if we don’t like the misfortunes that the laws of nature visit upon us, we
can change the laws—in fact, we can make them always have been different—
just by changing the way we think! (Talk about the power of positive think-
ing.) It would be very bad if my analysis endorsed such lunacy. I used to think
rigidification came to the rescue: in talking about what the laws would be if we
changed our thinking, we use not our hypothetical new standards of simplicity
and strength and balance, but rather our actual and present standards. But now
I think that is a cosmetic remedy only. It doesn’t make the problem go away, it
only makes it harder to state.
The real answer lies elsewhere: if nature is kind to us, the problem needn’t
arise. I suppose our standards of simplicity and strength and balance are only
partly a matter of psychology. It’s not because of how we happen to think that
a linear function is simpler than a quartic or a step function; it’s not because of
how we happen to think that a shorter alternation of prenex quantifiers is sim-
pler than a longer one; and so on. Maybe some of the exchange rates between
aspects of simplicity, etc., are a psychological matter, but not just anything
goes. If nature is kind, the best system will be robustly best—so far ahead of its
rivals that it will come out first under any standards of simplicity and strength
and balance. We have no guarantee that nature is kind in this way, but no evi-
dence that it isn’t. It’s a reasonable hope. (Lewis 1994, 479)
Let us get clear about the lunacy of the ratbag idealist. The worry is not so much
that simplicity and strength come from us and are vague. This is not so much of an
issue for Lewis for he is happy to concede that lawhood is contingent on our best sys-
tem. The dreaded lunacy consists, instead, in the unwelcome thought that—insofar
as our best deductive system depends on our chosen standards of simplicity, strength
and balance—the ensuing laws too would depend on our choice. Crucially, how laws
of nature might depend on us is rather opaque in this non-better-qualified lunacy of
the ratbag idealist. In Section 4, I return to this issue and make a couple of distinc-
tions that will hopefully clarify what is genuinely at stake in the idealist menace. But
for now, the basic idea is that should the standards change or be different, different
laws of nature might ensue from the newly defined best system. The ratbag idealist
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would put laws of nature on wheels—making laws of nature themselves (not just
lawhood) contingent on our chosen best system, after all.
In trying to bar this lunacy, Lewis offers an official metaphysical answer: if nature
is kind to us, the best system will be robustly the best. Laws of nature do not change
over time (as we happen to change our way of thinking about the best system) if na-
ture is, ultimately, kind to us. But what does our hope that nature is kind to us
amount to?
A prima facie safe bet is that the Humean mosaic consists of natural properties.3
For unnatural, gruesome properties would be unkind to us in inducing us to draw
unwarranted nomic conclusions from our best deductive system (i.e., conclusions
that would wildly diverge or even be contradictory after time t1).
4 Thus, the best an-
tidote against the ratbag idealist is some good dose of naturalness in the properties
composing the Humean mosaic. Regular co-occurrences of the same pairs of natural
properties over time would warrant the stability of laws of nature across sufficiently
good systems, and ultimately in the robustly best system (the system that comes out
first out of any rival).
For this reason, I disagree with Loewer’s argument that “Lewis’s metaphysical no-
tion of natural property is not needed by the BSA and, in fact, undermines what
seems to me to be the most attractive feature of the BSA” (Loewer 2007, 316–17).
Loewer’s argument against the metaphysics of natural properties is motivated by van
Fraassen’s concerns about the Lewisian eschatology of science. If it were possible to
reformulate BSA (as Loewer suggests) without coupling the aim of science with the
aim of Lewisian metaphysics, van Fraassen’s objection would be met.
Yet, there is a further, and in my view, more pressing motivation for Lewis’s ap-
peal to natural properties than securing a natural language in which the simplicity of
the atomic predicates for the Best Theory can be evaluated (as Loewer contends).5
If the line of argument so far is on the right track, Lewis’s BSA cannot do away with
the metaphysics of natural properties, because natural properties are after all needed
to ground Lewis’s hope that nature is indeed kind to us (against the lunacy of the rat-
bag idealist). Although the kindness of nature is just a hope, it is nonetheless a rea-
sonable one, Lewis says. It is the kind of hope needed to secure that a Best System
can eventually be in place, despite possibly changing standards of simplicity, strength,
and balance. Let me then ask: is the Lewisian requirement of natural properties suffi-
cient to deter the lunacy of the ratbag idealist? The next Section assesses the pros-
pects of Lewis’s considered response in terms of natural properties with a note of
pessimism.
3. THE RATBAG IDEALIST RELOADED
Suppose a defiant idealist comes to the fore. Building on Lewis’s concession that
standards of simplicity and strength are, at least in part, a matter of psychology, the
idealist invites us to consider some not-so-far-from-reality variations to the standard
of simplicity (S1, S2, . . .). These variations may capture different standards endorsed
by rival scientific communities. For example, a community might understand simplic-
ity in terms of a small number of entities postulated to explain a phenomenon p. A
not-so-outlandish example would be present-day defenders of MOND (or modified
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Newtonian gravity) in cosmology as an alternative to the Dark Matter-Dark Energy
programme (or more precisely, the KCDM model of cosmology). MOND advocates
appeal to the simplicity and mathematical elegance of their theory, which assumes
modifications to Newton’s acceleration law at the cosmological scale, over the rival
KCDM, which explains some of the same phenomena by introducing new entities
(dark matter and dark energy), whose exact nature and existence is still very much a
matter of ongoing scientific inquiry. In MOND, no dark matter needs be postulated
to explain galaxies’s flat rotation curves. This phenomenon is instead explained by
assuming that Newton’s second law breaks down below a certain threshold.6 Defenders
of the Dark Matter-Dark Energy programme, on the other hand, typically prefer to un-
derstand simplicity in terms of avoiding ad hoc modifications to well-entrenched scien-
tific theories (i.e., having to modify Newtonian dynamics, as MOND does). Similarly for
a scientific community, information strength might be understood in terms of number
of consequences one can derive from the best system. But another scientific community
might prefer to understand the same standard in terms of how explanatory the informa-
tion is.
Let us assume then—for the sake of keeping things simple—that there are only
two possible variations for both the standard of simplicity and the standard of infor-
mation content, respectively (in practice, looking at the history of science, many
more variations can be found across historical periods and scientific communities).7
Thus, an idealist may envisage the following logically possible rival scenarios, with
different triplets consisting of simplicity S1 or S2, information content I1 or I2 and
balance B1-4 between simplicity (S1 or S2), and information content (I1 or I2):
< S1; I1; B1 >; < S2; I1; B2 >; < S1; I2; B3 >; < S2; I2; B4 > (I)
The idealist now sets out to test Lewis’s assumption that if nature is kind to us,
there will indeed be a robustly best system, i.e., a system which will come out far
ahead of its rivals under any of these rival standards of simplicity, information con-
tent, and balance. Hence, she invites us to choose the robustly best system, among
the four possible candidates in (I) in the following way:
Def: The Robustly Best System
In world w2, if nature is kind to us (i.e., if there is indeed, say, a natural prop-
erty c), the robustly best system will be able to deliver laws of nature about
property c far ahead of any rival system that it will come out first under any
standards.
Given the four possible candidates to the Lewisian title of Best System in (I)—
viz., <S1, I1, B1>; <S2, I1, B2>; <S1, I2, B3>; <S2, I2, B4>—one might ask which
of these is the Best System. The ratbag idealist might invite us to consider three logi-
cally possible answers to this question:
1. All four candidates in (I) prove to be robustly the best—i.e., each and every
of them can deliver laws of nature about natural property c that ﬁt with
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other laws about other natural properties in w2, under any combination of
the varied standards.8
2. None of the four possible candidates in (I) proves robustly the best—i.e.,
each and every of them proves incapable of delivering laws about c that ﬁt
with other laws about other natural properties in w2, under any combination
of the varied standards.9
3. One and only one of the four candidates in (I) turns out to be robustly the
best (this is Lewis’s favourite answer, of course, based on the reasonable
hope of nature’s kindness to us).
If nature is kind to us, Lewis’s Best System Analysis must establish (3) as the only
valid answer in this menu. But how can Lewis’s BSA establish (3)? Once again, pre-
sumably, one might appeal to the naturalness of the properties involved in the
Humean mosaic. There can only be one robustly best system, namely the one capable
of tracking the Humean ordered n-tuple of natural properties <a, b, c, . . . , n> com-
posing the mosaic. Thus, the definition of the robustly best system should be
amended as follows:
Def. 2: The Robustly Best System
In world w2, if nature is kind to us (i.e., if there is indeed, say, a natural prop-
erty c, which is part of an ordered n-tuple of natural properties <a, b, c, . . . ,
n>), the robustly best system will be the one able to deliver laws of nature
about property c and about its companion natural properties at world w2, far
ahead of any rival system that it will come out first under any standards.
After all, one should expect the Lewisian robustly best system to deliver not just
one law about one natural property c, but instead several laws about several natural
properties regularly co-occurring at world w2. What are the prospects for such a ro-
bustly best system?
Let us go back to our example from cosmology, and let us assume—all else being
equal—that two rival systems running neck and neck diverge only as far as simplicity
S is concerned. MOND understands simplicity along the lines of avoiding unneces-
sary new entities (S1). The Dark Matter-Dark Energy (DM-DE) programme under-
stands simplicity along the lines of simple mathematical equations that do not break
down below a certain threshold (S2). Hence, the two rival systems can be expressed
as< S1, I1, B1> and <S2, I1, B2> (where a different balance B in each case takes
care of the difference between S1 and S2). The robustly best system is expected to
come out far ahead of its rival, if nature is kind to us. What would it be like for nature
to be kind to us in this case? How to choose between MOND and DM-DE?
One might expect nature to point us to the relevant natural property c in the
Humean mosaic (and its close companions) that might allow us to distinguish be-
tween the two rival systems and point us to the robustly best one. But what would
such natural property be? It might be either a property c1 concerning a particular
kind of Newtonian dynamics, which breaks down below a certain acceleration scale
a0. Or, it might be a property c2 concerning dark matter. Were nature kind to us, one
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would expect nature to point us in the right direction as to whether c1 or c2 is the rel-
evant natural property, whose non-nomic facts the nomic facts in the robustly best
system should supervene on. But of course, unless Ned Hall’s LOPP comes to the
rescue, there is no way one can ever know in advance whether c1 or c2 is the case.
10
In fact, it is ultimately the choice between our two candidate best systems that will
adjudicate the case as to whether—to the best of our knowledge—c1 or c2 is the rele-
vant natural property. And the choice between our two candidate best systems is dic-
tated by various motivations, not least by consensus gathering within the scientific
community about the perceived theoretical virtues and experimental evidence for
DM-DE over MOND, for example. Thus, the Humean mosaic of natural properties
cannot be expected to act as a metaphysical anchor for choosing the robustly best
system. For our reasonable hope in the kindness of nature (in pointing us to the
right natural properties) is downstream to scientists’ choice between sufficiently
good rival systems. Our reason for thinking that sparse natural properties have been
identified is a byproduct of scientists’ choosing the best system, in the first instance.
The ratbag idealist strikes back. Natural properties do not, after all, provide a safe
metaphysical anchor against the idealist menace, if our only epistemic access to them
is via the robustly best system, which (often enough) happens to be our currently pre-
ferred best system, e.g. DM-DE (in the absence of LOPP, and scientists of its ilk).
Natural properties do not secure the kindness of nature against this reloaded idealist
threat, which (through the lenses of current rival cosmological models) does not
seem, after all, such an out-of-this-world lunacy.
At this point, a Lewisian might reply along the following lines. Let us concede
that we do not know in advance whether c1 or c2 is in fact a natural property in the
Humean mosaic. As of today, for example, the scientific community has not conclu-
sively settled on the existence of dark matter, so as to rule out entirely the possibility
of an anomalous Newtonian acceleration that breaks down below a certain scale (as
MOND would have it). This detail notwithstanding, if nature is kind to us—the
Lewisian goes on—the robustly best system will still come out far ahead of its rival.
The robustly best system will (one day in the near future) include laws about either
c1 or c2 —we just do not know which yet; but it is a reasonable hope and is what we
aspire to in our theory-building. Only regularities concerning either c1 or c2 that
most contribute to the overall best balance of simplicity and strength will count as
laws in the robustly best system.
This Lewisian rejoinder does not make the problem disappear. But it somehow
deflates it. For it would seem that—despite us not having LOPP-ian access to natural
properties—natural properties could still fulfil their primary metaphysical task: secur-
ing that laws of nature are not on wheels by our ever changing standards of simplicity
and strength. There might be facts about the Big Bang (such as the Past Hypothesis),
or facts about dark matter that we may or may never come to confirm (or even dis-
cover). But insofar as these non-nomic facts feature somehow in the Humean mosaic
(even if we do not have epistemic access to them), we can expect them to work
within the mosaic to make nature overall kind to us and in pointing us to the robustly
best system. The next Section probes a bit further this possible Lewisian rejoinder.
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4 . CROSS-WORLD HUMEAN MOSAIC TO THE RESCUE?
Consider some slight variation to the Humean mosaic where our ordered n-tuple of
natural properties may indeed include properties that we do not know as yet (either
because we have not discovered them yet; or because they have been postulated but
not experimentally found; or because we simply cannot have epistemic access to
them, or else). Let us assume in particular that our natural property c is under a veil
of ignorance, so to speak, at time tn in world w2 (say, our world now) when the sci-
entific community has not settled yet as to whether c1 or c2 holds. According to a
suitable amendment to the Lewisian story, one can imagine that if nature is kind to
us, natural property c (be it c1 or c2) and non-nomic facts about it, should nonethe-
less feature in other possible worlds (w1, w3, w4, . . . wj). And, if nature is indeed kind
to us in this way, then the transitivity holding among possible n-tuples of (n – 1) nat-
ural properties in a cross-world Humean Mosaic HMw1–wj would secure that non-
nomic facts about natural property c provide a safe metaphysical anchor for the ro-
bustly best system at our current world w2 (even if c is under a veil of ignorance
there).11 In other words, even if c may be under a veil of ignorance in our world w2
now, it is its naturalness in a cross-world Humean Mosaic HMw1–wj that ultimately
explains how c can be made to work (with its companion natural properties) to sin-
gle out the robustly best system at w2. Let us unpack this possible Lewisian amend-
ment to the story so far.
This amendment is compatible with Lewis’s view that a natural property in, say,
world w1 must be natural in any other world (given what it is to be a natural prop-
erty); but it does not need to be instantiated in every possible world (and may well
be hidden under a veil of ignorance at w2). Suppose now that different natural prop-
erties, one at the time, may go uninstantiated (or maybe they are instantiated but un-
der a veil of ignorance like c is at w2) in different possible worlds. Hence, the following
variations to the respective Humean mosaics of various worlds w1 –wj:
<a; c; d; : : : ; n > in w1
<a; b; d : : : ; n > in w2
<b; c; d : : : ; n > in w3
: : :
(II)
The cross-world Humean mosaic is a disjunction of ordered n-tuples consisting of
all and only (n –1) natural properties across possible worlds w1–wj:
Crossworld Humean mosaic of natural properties:
HMw1–wj ¼<a; c; d; : : : ; n>w1[ < a; b; d : : : ; n> w2
[ < b; c; d : : : ; n>w3 [ : : :
(III)
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For nature to be kind to us, it would have to be the case that—despite c being
under a veil of ignorance at world w2—the transitivity relation among the n-tuples
(n – 1) of natural properties in the cross-world Humean mosaic (III) would none-
theless secure that c does feature in other possible worlds as a natural property.
Hence, the burden of discriminating the robustly best system at world w2 among the
possible candidates in (I) would ultimately fall on the cross-world HMw1–wj and its
kindness to us. The cross-world HMw1–wj would prove kind to us if it could guide us
towards the robustly best system at world w2. Such a robustly best system would
have to come out far ahead of all its rivals in (I), despite different standards of sim-
plicity S1 and S2 selecting either c1 or c2 as the relevant natural property in w2, and
despite us being under a veil of ignorance (in w2) as to whether c1 or c2 holds.
There seem to be only two possible options for the cross-world Humean mosaic
to display such kindness to us at world w2. The first relies on what I am going to call
the Uniqueness Thesis. The second resorts to some kind of Ur-Best System. Let us ex-
amine each option in turn. A first option would be to assume that it is possible to
map different best systems to different worldly n-tuples among the ones captured by
the cross-world Humean mosaic HMw1–wj. This mapping of different sets of nomic
facts onto different worlds w1–wj of non-nomic facts about (n – 1) natural properties
would have to be such that there is one and only one set of nomic facts for each
worldly class of (n – 1) natural properties. In this way, the robustly best system could
be identified with the set (and the only set) of nomic facts that maps onto the
worldly class of natural properties (n – 1) at world w2. This one-to-one mapping of
best systems and worldly classes of natural properties (n – 1)—among the ones in-
cluded in the cross-world Humean mosaic HMw1–wj—would require something
along the lines of:
Uniqueness Thesis
Given world w2, and the ordered n–tuple <a, b, d, . . . , n> w2 belonging to the
cross-world Humean mosaic HMw1–wj, there ought to be one and only one of
the four logically possible candidates for best system in (I) that is robustly the
best system at world w2 in virtue of tracking the correct n–tuple <a, b, d, . . . ,
n> w2 of natural properties at world w2 (mutatis mutandis for any other world
among w1–wj).
The Uniqueness Thesis forces upon us the view that the robustly best system has to
be the one (and the only one) that tracks the particular mosaic distribution of natural
properties instantiated in our world w2 (but not the properties instantiated in w1, w3,
or any other world). After all, the laws delivered by the robustly best system are con-
tingent on the world we happen to live in, and they could have been different, had
we lived in a different world with a slightly different set of natural properties. The
Uniqueness Thesis is meant to yield a clear winner (the robustly best system) for each
possible world among those included in the cross-world Humean mosaic. How credi-
ble is the Uniqueness Thesis?
For the thesis to work, it would have to prevent scenarios like the aforementioned
one where it is possible that more than one system, among the four ones in (I),
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maps onto the same worldly distribution of natural properties <a, b, d, . . . , n> w2
at w2. Given the veil of ignorance at world w2 about property c, the Uniqueness Thesis
would have to prove that it is not possible for the two candidate best systems <S1,
I1, B1>w2 and <S2, I1, B2>w2 to both map onto the set of natural properties <a, b,
d, . . . , n> w2.
But the Uniqueness Thesis lacks resources to prevent the possibility of rival best
systems mapping onto the same set of natural properties. Indeed, the Uniqueness
Thesis simply tells us that there ought to be one and only one of the four logically
possible candidates for best system in (I) that is robustly the best system at world w2.
But it does not tell us how to go about securing the sought-after one-to-one mapping
to prevent the above scenario, where more than one system (with slightly varied
standards of simplicity) can in fact map onto the very same worldly set of natural
properties at world w2. In other words, that natural property c (be it c1 or c2) features
in other mosaic distributions for other possible worlds among those in the cross-
world Humean mosaic, does nothing to point us in the right direction for identifying
the robustly best system at w2. For there are no cross-world mechanisms for how
non-nomic facts about natural properties at worlds w1, w3, or else, may provide an in-
dication for what the robustly best system ought to be at w2. Worse, there are no
cross-world mechanisms that could prevent scenarios where more than one candi-
date rival system at world w2 maps onto the same n-tuple of natural properties at w2.
Thus, the Uniqueness Thesis does not prove that there has to be a one-to-one map-
ping between nomic and non-nomic facts about natural properties for each world
w1–wj if not ‘by fiat’, i.e., by ultimately relying on whatever laws of nature happen to
be delivered (once again) by our currently accepted best system at world w2. In the
absence of cross-world mechanisms to map the correct n-tuples of (n – 1) instanti-
ated natural properties at any world w, with the one (and only one) set of laws of na-
ture in that same world, the robustly best system turns out to be (once more) nothing
but our currently accepted system at world w2. The Uniqueness Thesis is itself only a
cosmetic remedy against the idealist comeback.
A second prima facie more promising option may appeal to some kind of Ur-Best
System. The intuition behind this second option is more modest than the one behind
the Uniqueness Thesis. For no one-to-one mapping is invoked in the expectation to
deliver the robustly best system. Instead, the four logically possible candidates for
best system in (I) may be collectively taken as composing a—so to speak—Ur-Best
System that supervenes on the equivalence class of cross-worldly (n – 1) natural
properties captured by the cross-world Humean Mosaic HMw1–wj. The Ur-Best
System, as a whole, would map onto the disjunction of worldly natural properties
across worlds w1–wj, so as to secure that there has to be a robustly best system
(among rival ones) for a worldly distribution of natural properties.
But that’s the most that the Ur-Best System can also tell us. Namely, that some n-
tuple of natural properties in the cross-world Humean mosaic provides the supervenience
basis for some robustly best system among those in the Ur-Best System, without telling us
which n-tuple or which robustly best system. For there is no intraworld mechanism
for choosing which system of laws at world w2 comes ahead of any rival in superven-
ing on natural properties <a, b, d, . . . , n >w2 at world w2 (mutatis mutandis for any
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other world). In other words, let us grant that there is a robustly best system in the
Ur-Best System:
UrBest System
ð< S1; I1;B1> [ < S2; I1; B2> [ < S1; I2; B3> [ < S2; I2; B4>Þw2
To single out the robustly best system, one would need to prove a more substan-
tial claim than the innocuous and nonilluminating claim that the Ur-Best System su-
pervenes on the cross-world Humean mosaic HMw1–wj. For, once again, in the
absence of mechanisms for mapping any of the disjuncts in the Ur-Best System to any
of the disjunct n-tuples in HMw1–wj, the possibility of singling out the robustly best
system among rival ones fades away.
Moral: the Lewisian possible rejoinder in terms of cross-world Humean mosaic of
natural properties cannot deflate the idealist comeback. Either the Lewisian rejoinder
buys into a restrictive thesis such as the Uniqueness Thesis without providing a mecha-
nism for mapping nomic facts to non-nomic sets of natural properties in each and ev-
ery world. Or the Lewisian rejoinder concedes too much with the Ur-Best System
without explaining how any candidate to the best system title (among all possible
ones) could ever pick out an n-tuple of natural properties rather than any other from
the cross-world Humean mosaic.
The kindness of the cross-world Humean mosaic at world w2 seems then to re-
duce to the claim that if we happen to live in the world we do, with the properties
that there happen to be, then the best system that we happen to have historically de-
veloped turns out to be the robustly best one! And this might not sound a very satis-
factory response to the reloaded ratbag idealist.
Is this bad news for Lewis’s BSA? Not entirely. In the next and final section, I
foreshadow a different way of answering the ratbag idealist on Lewis’s behalf. This
further friendly amendment to Lewis’s BSA does not rely so much on the robustly
best system being able to pick out the right n-tuple of natural properties. Instead, it
relies on the robustly best system being able to single out the same axioms and theo-
rems across a perspectival series of best systems, defined by historically changing stan-
dards of simplicity, strength, and balance. Hence, ultimately, the robustly best system
that can eschew the ratbag idealist is, I am going to suggest, a perspectivalist better
best system.12
5. A PERSPECTIVALIST BETTER BEST SYSTEM AGAINST THE
RATBAG IDEALIST
Let us take stock and remind ourselves of the idealist threat that Lewis regarded as
sheer lunacy. The worry, expressed in Lewis’s long quote in Section 2, was that an
idealist might come to the fore, who might put on wheels laws of nature via ever-
changing standards of simplicity and strength. If these standards are ultimately de-
pendent on us, by changing them, the laws of nature too would be vulnerable to
change. Hence, Lewis appeals to nature’s kindness (and, to natural properties) as a
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way of deterring the idealist lunacy, with all the problems I have expounded in
Sections 3 and 4.
But here is another response available to Lewis, a response he did not consider,
but which is nonetheless congenial to his view that lawhood is contingent on us and
what happens to be our best system (without putting laws of nature themselves on
wheels). Consider how our standards of simplicity and strength have historically
evolved, and how different scientific communities have come to regard simplicity, for
example, either in terms of deriving the causes of motion from the simplest principles
(e.g., Newton’s force laws); or in terms of integrating the Lagrangian function of the
variables of state over all the possible paths a mass point might take, and choose the
one with the smallest value (Hamilton’s principle). Or consider how the standard of
strength has changed in the passage from the best system where Descartes’s original
law of momentum conservation featured (to explain elastic collisions between solid
bodies); to our current best system, where momentum conservation is still deployed
to search for Beyond Standard Model physics (e.g., missing transverse momentum in
particle collisions is a possible signature for Beyond Standard Model particles) at the
Large Hadron Collider, CERN.
It is not just in contemporary cosmology that we witness rival standards of sim-
plicity currently at play in the choice between DM-DE vs. MOND. The evolution of
our standards of simplicity and strength is stark across the history of science (think
of simplicity and strength in Lavoisier’s system of chemistry, where conservation of
mass originally appeared, and in Einstein’s relativity theory where mass conservation
reappears as energy conservation, i.e., E ¼ mc2).13 Similarly, stark is the resilience of
our fundamental laws of nature across historically evolving best systems (e.g., from
mass conservation to momentum conservation). These brief remarks can provide
the platform for a more promising (in my view) reply to the ratbag idealist.
The ratbag idealist seems to conflate two distinct notions of dependence-on-us (so
to speak). The standards of simplicity and strength may be dependent-on-us in a first
sense that they depend on features of our psychology, our language, our conceptual
make-up. Lewis presumably had in mind this first notion of dependence-on-us in devis-
ing strategies to deflect the ratbag idealist via nature’s kindness. But, I contend, this
first notion of dependence-on-us does not have a genuine bite, and should not be the
cause of concerns for Lewis (and his followers). For unless some persuasive
Berkeleian idealist or Goodmanian constructivist argument can be made to the effect
of denying to simplicity and strength the very normative role of ‘standards’—ac-
knowledged and used by well-established scientific communities—the threat posed
by the envisaged ratbag idealist amounts to sheer lunacy (as Lewis himself called it).
However, a second notion of dependence-on-us proves at once more plausible and
worrisome. For simplicity and strength may depend on us in the sense of being de-
pendent on the established scientific practice of real scientific communities across
time. Rather than some far-fetched Berkeleian or Goodmanian scenarios, the lunacy
of the ratbag idealist finds its more dangerous reincarnation in a much more realistic
and mundane notion of dependence-on-us displayed by real scientific communities
across historical periods. Is Lewis’s BSA going to succumb to it?
Laws of Nature, Natural Properties, and the Robustly Best System  417
My answer to the question is ‘no’, with a caveat: i.e., provided Lewis’s BSA is
amended to reject the Lewisian idea that the standards are fixed once and for all
(LOPPian standards) and accepts instead the perspectivalist idea that these stan-
dards depend on the epistemic needs of scientific communities, which use them to
monitor the ongoing performance of scientific knowledge claims (in this case, nomic
claims) over time. In Massimi (forthcoming), I have called simplicity and strength
standards of performance adequacy (among many others which are not relevant to the
specific discussion of Lewis’s BSA here). They are standards that allow scientific
communities across historical times to assess how well laws of nature inherited from
previous scientific communities fare over time. Nomic claims that no longer fare well
on the score of balancing simplicity and strength get discarded over time; those that
continue to fare well are retained. The perspectivalist twist to Lewis’s Best System
that I have called in Massimi (forthcoming) ‘novel perspectival Best System Account’
(npBSA) suggests that
Given a scientific perspective sp, and given simplicity, strength, and balance
(SSBsp) qua standards of performance adequacy, laws of nature are axioms or
theorems of the perspectival series of best systems, which satisfy SSBsp1, SSBsp2,
SSBsp3, and so forth.
The main rationale of this perspectivalist twist to Lewis’s BSA is to take on board
the evidence coming from the history of science about the resilience of our funda-
mental laws, despite historical changes in what counts as the ‘best system’ (from
Lavoisier to Einstein, in the example of mass conservation). The clear advantage of
the move is to turn what looks prima facie as a serious shortcoming of Lewis’s view
(the idealist threat) into a feature that can easily be accommodated by Lewis’s BSA
under the perspectivalist twist I am suggesting to it.
But I want to conclude this paper by mentioning an additional bonus of the per-
spectivalist twist. If the suggestion is correct, it has also the potential of answering
van Fraassen’s famous criticism (mentioned at the beginning of this paper) against
Lewis’s “eschatology of science.” For while it is not the case that scientists intention-
ally go about building the best system (as van Fraassen correctly points out), there is
a sense in which the Lewisian best system might emerge as the ideal system along
the lines of (npBSA), i.e., across scientific perspectives by the end of the inquiry. The
perspectivalist Best System is nothing over and above the perspectival series of (his-
torically well-defined) best systems, which have happened to satisfy evolving stan-
dards of simplicity, strength, and balance across scientific perspectives (SSBsp1,
SSBsp2, SSBsp3, and so forth). Our beloved laws of nature are nothing over and
above axioms or theorems that have proved resilient across the perspectival shifts of
(historically well-defined) best systems. This move is congenial to a more general,
Kantian-inspired view of the systematic unity of science qua ‘perspectival knowl-
edge’.14 Lewis’s quest for a Best System can be regarded as the Kantian search for a
systematized body of knowledge; a search which is never fully realized at any given
historical time but remains nonetheless a regulative idea of scientific inquiry across
scientific perspectives. In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the
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Critique of Pure Reason Kant described the quest for systematic unity in our scientific
knowledge as a focus imaginarius. As a vanishing point allows painters to draw in per-
spective, systematic unity allows scientists to pursue scientific research as if there
were an imaginary goal. But the goal is imaginary and never given. Is this “eschatol-
ogy of science” by other names? It is not. Instead, it is a (Kantian) hope, one that
Lewis (and Lewisians) could avail themselves of, for it proves at least as reasonable
as (if not more reasonable than) the hope in nature’s kindness.
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NOTES
1. The best balance is the balance that maximizes in a way simplicity and strength, which are notoriously
standards pulling in opposite directions. For simplicity would seem to recommend fewer assumptions in
the deductive system (at the potential cost of reducing the information content that can be deduced).
2. “Unless we are prepared to forgo some of the uses of the distinction between natural and unnatural
properties, we shall have no easy way to define it without circularity. That is no reason to reject the dis-
tinction. Rather, that is a reason to accept it—as primitive, if needs be” (Lewis 1983, 344).
3. On Lewis’s natural properties, see Lewis (1983, 1986). For a critical discussion of Lewis’s natural proper-
ties in the context of classical physics, see Butterfield (2006) and Weatherson (2006). For naturalness in
Lewis, see Weatherson (2013) and Dorr and Hawthorne (2013). For more general discussions about
Humean Supervenience, naturalness and modality see Beebee and MacBride (2015) and Weatherson
(2015).
4. To appreciate why natural properties matter so much in this context, consider the following Goodmanian
scenario, where the natural property of having half-integral spin for a particle is accompanied by a non-
natural gruesome property of having half-integral spin*. Half-integral spin* can be thought of as the
Goodmanian property of being examined before time t1 (say, 2020) and having half-integral spin; or, be-
ing examined after time t1 (2020) and having integral spin. If the Humean mosaic included any such non-
natural gruesome properties alongside the natural ones, two rival systems could run neck and neck. In
one system (let us call it A, where natural property half-integral spin features) it would be a law of nature
(our spin-statistics theorem) that All half-integral spin particles are fermions and all integral-spin particles are
bosons. In another rival system (let us call it B where property half-integral spin* features), it would be a
law of nature (a spin-statistics theorem*) that All half-integral spin* particles are fermions and all integral-
spin particles are bosons, which implies that after time t1 (2020) all integral spin particles are fermions and
all integral-spin particles are bosons! The assumption of natural properties is then key to avoid this kind
of Goodmanian scenario where rival systems might be concocted (out of unnatural properties) whose un-
natural kinds partially overlap with natural kinds—e.g., half-integral spin* particles—with possibly contra-
dictory ensuing nomic claims.
5. According to Loewer, Lewis’s main motivation for introducing natural properties is the desire to fix a
natural language NL in which the BSA can be formulated to avoid the charge of trivialization:
“The first work that Lewis put natural properties to do was to pick out a language NL relative to
which the Best Theory is evaluated with respect to simplicity. Recall that he motivated the introduction
of natural properties into his characterization of laws because the system axiomatised by ‘(x) Fx’ (where
‘Fx’ is a predicate true of all and only individuals that exist at the actual world) apparently maximizes
simplicity and informativeness and so counts as the best system of the world. The consequence is that
all true generalisations are laws. Lewis’s remedy is to add the requirement that the atomic predicates in
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the language of a Best Theory refer to perfectly natural properties—where these are properties that do
all the metaphysical work Lewis assigns them.” (Loewer 2007, 324)
Loewer argues that such a charge can in fact be avoided, without having to buy into the metaphysics of
natural properties that makes Lewis vulnerable to van Fraassen’s objection.
6. “For disk galaxies MOND is more economical, and more falsifiable, than the DM paradigm” (Bekenstein
2010, 5).
7. I discuss some examples taken from the history of science in Massimi (forthcoming).
8. For example, it might be the case that each and every of these four possible candidates in (I)—viz., <S1,
I1, B1>; <S2, I1, B2>; <S1, I2, B3>; <S2, I2, B4>—satisfies Lewis’s criterion of achieving the best bal-
ance between their respective criteria of simplicity and strength. For example, it might be argued that the
balance B2 between S2 and I1 is different from the balance B3 between S1 and I2; nonetheless, B2 and B3
are both the best balance that can be achieved given those two variations of the two standards of S and I.
As a result, it might be the case that the laws delivered by each of these four different candidates to the
Lewisian title of Best System are partially overlapping, partially different. Yet each candidate qualifies for
the title of The Best System in achieving the best balance that can be achieved given the specific varia-
tions of standards S and I. I thank Angela Breitenbach for helpful discussions on this point.
9. After all, why there must be necessarily a Best System, if not by Lewis’s fiat? It might be the case that
each and every one of these four possible candidates to the title of Best System fails in different ways in
achieving the best balance between their respective variations in the standards of simplicity and strength.
10. There is a wider debate about natural properties that I do not have the space to address here, with schol-
ars defending a view similar to my point above (i.e., natural properties are downstream to accepted scien-
tific theories); others denying that any evidence might ever be available to tell us whether something is a
natural property; and a further group of scholars defending natural properties. See D.H. Mellor (2012),
Nolan (2015), and Nanay (2014) for some examples.
11. D.H. Mellor (1977, 306) appeals to the transitivity in the equivalence class of possible cross-world sam-
ples of ‘water’, which might lack some of the important constitutive properties, as an argument against
Putnam’s essentialism about natural kinds. Mellor intends the example as an argument for Fregean
descriptivism against Putnam’s emphasis on bearing the same microstructural-kind relation to archetypes
on planet Earth to define natural kinds. Here, in a very different context, I see the argument from the
cross-world Humean mosaic as a possible friendly amendment to Lewis’s appeal to natural properties to
single out the robustly best system, given Lewis’s modal realism.
12. I have introduced this terminology and a preliminary discussion of a novel perspectivalist Best System
Account of lawhood in Massimi (forthcoming), on which I draw and expand in Section 5.
13. I discuss all these examples in Massimi (forthcoming), to which the reader is kindly referred if interested
in more historical details.
14. I develop the notion of perspectival knowledge in relation to Kant’s systematic unity as a regulative idea of
scientific inquiry in Massimi (2017).
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